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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a simple short-run post-Keynesian model in which the key aspects of shadow 
banking, namely securitization and the production of structured finance instruments, are explicitly 
formalized. At the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to broaden purely real-side post-
Keynesian models and their traditional focus on shareholder-value orientation, the financialization of 
non-financial firms, and the profit-led vs wage-led dichotomy. We rather put emphasis on the role of 
financial institutions and rentier-friendly environment in determining the predominance of specific 
growth and distribution regimes. First, we illustrate the macroeconomic rationale of shadow banking 
practices. We show how, before the 2007-8 crisis, securitization and shadow banking allowed for an 
increase in profitability for the whole financial sector, while apparently keeping leverage under control. 
Second, we define a variety of shadow-banking-led regimes in terms of economic activity, productive 
capital accumulation, and income distribution. We show that both an ‘exhilarationist’ and a 
‘stagnationist’ regime may prevail, nevertheless characterized by a probable increase in income 
inequality between rentiers and wage earners 
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1. Introduction 
The outbreak of the sub-prime mortgage crisis has brought to the forefront the role of the 
so-called shadow banking system as major responsible for the 2007-2008 financial 
meltdown. Paul McCulley, former managing director at PIMCO investment fund, is 
generally considered as the father of the expression ‘shadow banks’. With this term, he 
referred to those financial intermediaries funding their banking activity with uninsured 
commercial paper and without the backstop of the FED (McCulley, 2007, p.2). However, 
such definition, together with its implicit distinction between traditional regulated banks 
on the one hand and new, unregulated (i.e. shadow) financial institutions on the other, is 
controversial. Fein (2013) notes that shadow bank “exists as an integral part of the 
regulated banking system (Fein, 2013, p.2)”. Most of the practices and actors usually 
considered as shadow banking (see more on this below) actually originate, are performed, 
or are at least indirectly related to traditional regulated financial operators. 
An intensive debate on the implications of shadow banking in terms of banking 
theory and monetary economics theory has sparked among economists. Following Adrian 
and Shin (2010), the first strand of literature provides a prevalently microeconomic 
perspective on ‘the changing nature of financial intermediation’ as due to the development 
of shadow banking. It describes in details the functioning of shadow banking actors, their 
complex nest of relations, and main characteristics of the corresponding financial 
instruments (Coval et al., 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2010 and 2012; Cetorelli et al., 2012). 
However, it pays relatively scarce attention to the consequences of the development of 
shadow banking on macroeconomic variables such as economic growth, income 
distribution, as well as on the overall macroeconomic stability and systemic resilience to 
financial shocks. 
The second strand of the literature – i.e. monetary economics – albeit partially 
overlapping with the banking approach, shows much more concern for the 
macroeconomic aspects of the story. Several studies have gained momentum in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis by interpreting shadow banking 
development, and the financial crisis itself, through the lens of the Minskyan financial 
instability hypothesis (Tymoigne, 2009; Nersisyan and Wray, 2010; Dymski, 2010). From 
a methodological point of view, most of these contributions rely upon argumentative 
analyses. They do not frame shadow banking in a formal model and do not try to assess 
analytically its economy-wide implications. 
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At the best of our knowledge, only a few studies have tried to model the intrinsic 
fragility of contemporary financial systems (Eatwell et. al, 2008; Nikolaidi, 2015; Bhaduri 
et al., 2015). Nikolaidi (2015), for instance, models securitization in a stock-flow-
consistent model in order to assess the heightened macroeconomic fragility that may arise 
out of financial sector-induced increases in households’ leverage. Eatwell et al. (2008) 
focus on the pro-cyclical and destabilizing dynamics of investment banks’ leverage 
emerging out of securitization practices. Finally, Bhaduri et al. (2015) describe systemic 
fragility as due to securitization-fuelled boom-and-boost cycles in financial assets’ prices.  
Although extremely interesting, most of these studies still focus on a single specific 
aspect of the shadow banking system only. Nikolaidi (2015) and Bhaduri et al. (2015), for 
instance, do not bring into the picture the leading role of repos in fuelling the expansion 
of shadow banking practices. Eatwell et al. (2008) offer an oversimplified representation 
of repos, restrictively identified as a monetary policy tool. They neglect an explicit 
treatment of repos as financial relations connecting the different actors involved in the 
process of securitization and in the creation of structured finance products. More in 
general, all these contributions do not match their macroeconomic analysis with a clear 
investigation of the rationale and the purposes of shadow banking-related practices. 
In this article, we try to combine some aspects of the abovementioned contributions 
on shadow banking with the post-Keynesian literature on finance-dominated capitalism. 
This literature mainly consists of new-Kaleckian or Harrodian models aiming to study the 
real-side effects of the financialization of non-financial firms (henceforth NFF). 
Accordingly, it identifies and perhaps reduces financialization to the so-called shareholder 
value orientation, i.e. the increased concern by NFF management for shareholders’ 
interests as opposed to stakeholders’ interests (Stockhammer, 2004; Skott and Ryoo, 
2008; Hein, 2010; Onaran et al. 2011). On the one hand, this change in NFF corporate 
governance is portrayed as the responsible (among other factors) for the reduction in 
workers’ bargaining power and in the corresponding wage share on national income.i On 
the other hand, NFF financialization has also induced NFF to more extensively deploy 
retained earnings to distribute dividends to shareholders, to pay generous stock option-
related compensations to top managers, and to finance financial investments, rather than 
productive investments and innovation efforts (Mazzucato 2013; Botta, 2016). Both 
phenomena are eventually considered as conducive to economic stagnation and rising 
income inequality, in particular in the context of wage-led economies (see Onaran and 
Obst, 2016). 
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The existing post-Keynesian literature on financialization, although extremely 
relevant, does not take into account a salient aspect of financialization itself, perhaps the 
most prominent, i.e. the development of shadow banking and shadow banking-related 
practices. Indeed, by relying on pure ‘real-side’ models that neglect, by definition, any 
‘active’ financial sector, they cannot capture the intrinsic evolution of the financial sector 
as such, as well as the ensuing effects on the real side of the economy. This work aims at 
addressing this shortcoming and filling the gap through a simple analytical model in which 
shadow banking institutions and practices are explicitly considered.  
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, differently from Eatwell et al. (2008), 
Nikolaidi (2015) and Bhaduri et al. (2015), we try to disclose and formalise the rationale 
of shadow banking (the securitization of existing assets and the issuance of structured 
finance products) from a macroeconomic perspective. We focus on the behaviour of entire 
financial compartments, and eventually on the financial system as a whole, rather than on 
single operators. We show how shadow-banking activities have been designed and 
implemented in order to increase the profitability of financial institutions – in particular 
commercial banks - and, at the same time, apparently and artificially maintain their 
leverage under control. Second, we try to assess the impacts that shadow banking practices 
exert on the whole economy. In so doing, we move the post-Keynesian perspective on 
finance-dominated capitalism away from its (almost exclusive) focus on the 
macroeconomics of finance-led changes in NFF governance. Even further, we extend the 
macroeconomic analysis recently provided by Bhaduri et al. (2015), and we show how 
shadow-banking ballooning may affect a variety of macroeconomic variables such as 
economic activity, real sector investments, and income distribution. ii  An interesting 
finding (also marking a discontinuity with respect to the previous literature) is that rising 
income inequality in financialized economies may be due to the increasing imbalance 
between income (wages) generated in the real sector and income (rents) emerging from 
financial assets originated by shadow banking financial engineering, rather than from the 
traditional distributional conflict between workers and capitalists. 
In section 2, we briefly describe how our economy works, and how the financial and 
the real sectors are intertwined. We adopt the national accounting perspective as 
developed by the post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent approach (Godley and Lavoie 
2007, Caverzasi and Godin, 2014), thus displaying financial-real relations and their 
implications in standard balance sheet and transaction matrices. Section 3 deals with the 
effects that securitization and the development of structured finance instruments can have 
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on the profitability and leverage of both commercial banks (henceforth CBs) and financial 
firms (henceforth FFs). Section 4 moves the attention to the real side of the economy. We 
present a simple short-run post-Keynesian model to show the effects of shadow-banking 
practices on economic activity, productive investments, and income distribution. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. A simple closed economy model with shadow banking 
There is no doubt that the remarkable expansion of the financial sector with respect to the 
real side of the economy represents a salient aspect of the evolution of developed capitalist 
economies in the last three decades. This long-term process involved a deep change in the 
structure of the financial system, as well as in its relation with the real side of the economy. 
New financial instruments, as well as new financial institutions emerged (see Botta et al., 
2015, pp.200-1). 
The core of the so-called shadow banking is the process of securitization: 
“securitized banking is the business of packaging and reselling loans, with repo 
agreements as the main source of funds” (Gorton and Metrick 2012, p.425). This financial 
activity involves different kinds of financial institutions. Various layers of intermediation 
and several financial assets transformations take place within the financial system (see 
Pozsar et al., 2013). Through securitization, different types of credit (e.g. student loans, 
consumer loans, mortgages etc.) are transformed into a multitude of financial 
instruments. These types of credit are first sold to other financial institutions (e.g. issuers 
of asset-backed securities, investment banks, brokers and dealers) and then transformed 
into increasingly complex structured financial instruments (MBS, ABS, CDO, CDO2 etc.). 
The two key financial instruments in this process are structured finance - CDOs in our 
model - and repos. In the end, financial relationships are commodified (Lysandrou, 2005) 
and used to ‘produce’ complex financial instruments, which are sold to the savers in 
different forms, through the intermediation of diverse financial institutions (e.g. Money 
Market Mutual Funds, pension funds, insurance companies).  
Figure 1 below captures some of the preeminent aspects of shadow banking, and 
the main elements of the rise of securitization activities. It shows the values of: (i) 
securitised real estate loans, held as assets by the financial sector; (ii) mortgages issued by 
CB; (iii) repos, displayed as an asset of CBs. MBS and repos exhibit a skyrocketing rise 
from mid-1990s, and a sharp fall after the 2007-2008 crisis. The dynamic of mortgages 
appears relatively smoother. However, it is important to bear in mind that the nominal 
7 
 
value of this type of stock is significantly higher than the others two are. Two 
considerations are of particular interest. First, the steep rise of MBS anticipated and 
somehow drove the rise in repos and mortgages. MBS started growing in 1996, exactly 
when the Fed reinterpreted the Glass-Steagall “allowing bank holding companies to earn 
up to 25 percent of their revenues in investment banking (Sherman 2009, p.2)”. Second, 
the fall in the stock of securitised mortgages started in the third quarter of 2006. Therefore, 
it not only anticipated the dynamic of the other two series, but it also started one year 
before what is commonly acknowledged as the starting date of the crisis (August 2007). 
This last point is extremely relevant to understand how FFs’ financial solidity dramatically 
worsened in the run up to the crisis (see more on this below). 
  
[FIGURE 1] 
 
In this section of the paper, we provide a simplified representation of the 
abovementioned key aspects of shadow banking and of the way they affect the financial 
and the real side of the economy, as well as their interconnections. We assume a closed 
private economy without government. We pay specific attention to the financial sphere, 
here subdivided in CBs and FFs. These two sectors interact via the securitization of CBs’ 
assets (bought by FFs) and via the provision of repo loans financing the purchases of 
securitized assets.  
Table 1 shows the Balance Sheet of the economy.  
 
 [TABLE 1] 
 
Our economy comprises six sectors, namely workers, rentiers, NFF, CBs, and FF 
(i.e. investment banks, broker and dealers, and hedge funds), and the Central Bank. We 
take in to account nine different assets. CBs hold two sets of assets. On the one hand, (JCB) 
denotes sector’s own funds as initially provided by CBs’ shareholders when subscribing 
equities. We assume CBs to hold their own funds (or Tier 1 capital) as reserves in form of 
cash. On the other hand, there are assets used by the traditional banking system to provide 
different forms of credit to the other sectors of the economy: loans (L) to NFF, repos (RP) 
to FF, and mortgages (M) to working households. CBs move out a portion (z) of mortgages 
from their balance sheet, selling this fraction to FF. This operation is usually implemented 
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through Special Purpose Vehicles, which, for sake of clarity, we decided not to include in 
our model.  
CBs have two kinds of liabilities: workers’ deposits (D) and equities (ECB). The 
former is held by working households and does not pay interests, while rentiers hold the 
latter. Equities can here be conceived as the counterpart of CBs’ own funds. For the sake 
of simplicity, they are assumed to remain constant. This also applies to FF, whose equities 
(EFF) are again held by the rentiers. FFs rely on two types of liabilities to finance their 
activities: collateralized debt obligation (CDO) sold to rentiers (CDOR) and to NFF 
(CDONFF), and repos (RP), used to collect funds from CBs. Next to cash (JFF), FFs hold the 
fraction of mortgages (zM) purchased from CBs. 
Reverting to the real side of the economy, we consider two classes of households. 
Workers hold their wealth in form of deposits (D) and houses (pHH). Their stock of debt is 
represented by mortgages (M). Rentiers do not accumulate debt and hold their wealth in 
form of financial assets: Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOR) and Equities (E). NFF are 
indebted toward CBs (L) and own both real and financial assets, respectively K (the 
nominal value of real capital) and collateralized debt obligations (CDONFF). 
 
[TABLE 2]  
 
Table 2 shows the so-called full integration matrix, thus including net financial 
flows among the different sectors (transaction flow matrix above the first dotted line) and 
the update of the stock (revaluation matrix between the second and third dotted line).  
Workers receive income in the form of wages (W) by NFF and have two outflows: 
they buy consumption goods from NFF and pay interests on their outstanding stock of 
mortgages (iM*M). The flow associated with interest payments on mortgages will split 
between CBs and FFs according to the share (z) of mortgages owned by the latter. Rentiers 
will receive dividends (DIV) from CBs (DIVCB) and FFs (DIVFF), as well as interest on CDOs 
(i.e. r*CDOR), on which they also pay a fee (CDOR).iii More in detail, the interest rate (r) 
stands for the fixed coupon interest rate originally defined in CDO contracts, rather than 
the effective interest rate that eventually emerges from market transactions, and 
connected (in a negative way) to CDOs prices.iv NFF pay wages (W) and sell consumption 
goods (C), and investment goods (I). Their financial earnings are the interests received on 
the share of CDO they hold (r*CDONFF), while their financial outflow is made by the fee 
they pay to FFs (f*CDONFF) and the interest on loans paid to CBs (iL*L).  
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We assume CBs to distribute to rentiers, in the form of dividends (DIVCB), all the 
earnings they make out of the interest received on their assets. This applies also to FFs, 
whose inflows are the interests received on the share of mortgages owned (zM) and on the 
fees on the CDO issued (f*CDO). We assume NFF not to distribute dividends. Their 
inclusion would simply make our understanding of shadow-banking-related real-side 
consequences of financialization harder to catch. In addition, this also allow us to 
emphasize the novelty of the venue of analysis we are exploring with respect to previous 
post-Keynesian contributions, based on the concept of shareholder value orientation. 
Nonetheless, we still preserve the other relevant aspect of NFF financialization. NFF can 
deploy retained earnings to accumulate financial assets (CDONFF) rather than investing in 
the real economy. 
In this paper, we take into account multiple financial assets, each of them associated 
to a specific interest rate. Given our aim, we do not discuss how each specific interest rate 
is determined (e.g. by applying a mark-up rate on the ‘cost of liquidity’ as influenced by 
central bank monetary policy). Rather, we are interested in the structure of the whole set 
of interest rates. In this context, suffice to say that the levels of the interest rates generally 
depends on the relative perceived risk of the underlying assets, which in turn depends 
upon their maturity, their level of collateralization, and their degree of ‘shiftability’ (see 
Mehrling, 2011). Accordingly, we may safely assume the following interest rate structure 
to prevail, at least in ‘normal times’: 𝑖𝑀 ≥ 𝑖𝐿 > 𝑟 > 𝑖𝑅𝑃. 
The revaluation matrix is straightforward, as it shows the change in the level of the 
same stocks described within the explanation of the aggregate balance sheet. Nonetheless, 
some elements are worth noting. First, following Adrian and Shin (2010), FFs finance their 
holding of new mortgages either through repo from CBv or by selling new CDO contracts 
to rentiers and to NFFvi. They rely on these two different types of borrowings for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the issuance of apparently riskless long-term obligations (i.e. 
CDOs) requires overcollateralization (the value of purchased underlying securitised assets 
must be higher than the value of issued collateralized obligations). Accordingly, FFs can 
only partially finance assets purchases through CDOs issuances, the remaining part being 
financed by recollecting funds on repos markets. On the other hand, repos markets stretch 
short-term cheap funds, however prone to dry up quickly. Accordingly, FFs will try to 
largely rely upon long-term CDOs-linked borrowing. Even though relatively more 
expensive than repos, CDOs-linked borrowing represents a more stable source of finance 
than the latter. Second, NFF can use their profits, as well as the new inflow of loans, to 
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finance the purchase of real or financial capital. Finally, we assume house purchases to 
give rise to purely intra-sectorial exchanges among households. For the sake of simplicity, 
we do not consider the construction of new houses (more on this below). Accordingly, the 
price of existing dwellings adjusts to balance the supply and demand for houses, the latter 
being fed by new mortgages. New mortgages conceded to the workers’ households will 
eventually show up in price changes of the existing dwellings.  
In this paper, we focus on the ‘financialization-determined’ short-run dynamics of 
the economy, rather than on its long-run macroeconomic stability. Our main interest is to 
analyse how shadow-banking-related current flows, as emerging from accumulated 
financial positions and past financialization processes, influence current economic activity 
and income distribution. In this regard, financialization has first allowed a wider range of 
households to benefit from an increasing amount of (then securitised) mortgages. This, in 
turn, has stimulated economic activity also by feeding the construction of new dwellings. 
Without neglecting the importance of this channel, here we do not explicitly consider it. 
As far as the impacts on the GDP are concerned, we rather focus on the positive effect 
financialization may have induced on aggregate consumption and economic activity 
mainly by leading to higher prices of existing dwellings, thus raising households’ wealth 
through time. Accordingly, we keep the amounts of houses (H) constant. We apply the 
same logic to equities (E), which in this model simply represent shareholders’ initial 
contributions to the constitution of financial corporations. 
 
3. Financial sector’s leverage and profitability under securitization.  
The existing literature on shadow banking has devoted hardly any words on the 
macroeconomic rationale of securitization and the issuance of structured finance 
products. In this section, we try to formally demonstrate the key effects of securitization, 
as well as of the creation of structured finance products, on the profitability and leverage 
of CBs and, more broadly, FF. 
 
3.1 The commercial bank sector 
Consistently with the description of shadow banking provided in Table 1 and Table 2, CBs 
first originate financial assets, i.e. mortgages, and then distribute them throughout the 
financial system, thanks to the securitization process. At the same time, they provide other 
financial operators with the required loans, i.e. repos, in order to buy securitised assets. In 
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this sense, CBs act on both sides of the market for securitised assets (see Botta et al., 2015, 
p. 212). This process affects CBs’ leverage, as stated in equation (1):     
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 =
𝛾1[(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝐿] + 𝛾2𝑅𝑃 + 𝛾3𝐽
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(1) 
 
According to standard procedures to compute financial actors’ capital adequacy 
ratios and leverages, financial assets are weighted for their perceived degree of riskiness. 
In equation (1),  𝛾𝑛 (with n from 1 to 3) stands for the different weights associated to the 
four assets CBs may hold in their balance sheet. Mortgages to workers, as well as loans to 
firms, are classified as long-term (relatively) risky assets with respect to repos and cash. 
Repos usually are short-term collateralized monetary market loans with a perceived low 
risk, whilst cash is a risk-free asset. Accordingly, we assume (𝛾1 > 𝛾2 > 𝛾3). For the sake of 
simplicity we set (𝛾3 = 0) and (𝛾2 = 1), so that: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 =
𝛾1[(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝐿] + 𝑅𝑃
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(1.b) 
 
Consistently with equation (1.b), the profitability of the overall CBs sector, as 
measured by returns on equity (ROE), is: 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐵 =
𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝑖𝐿𝐿 + 𝑖𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑃
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(2) 
 
Through the repo system, CBs provide financial corporations with the required 
means of payments to buy a part of securitised mortgages. The remaining portion is 
financed by the issuance of structured finance products, namely CDO. If we assume that 
total CDO issuance represents a portion 𝜗 of the value of total securitised mortgages, we 
get:  
𝐶𝐷𝑂 = 𝜗𝑧𝑀 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ    0 < 𝜗 < 1 (3) 
𝑅𝑃 = (1 − 𝜗)𝑧𝑀 (4) 
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Substituting equations (3) and (4) into (1.b) and (2) respectively, we get: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 =
𝛾1𝐿 + [𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + (1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(5) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐵 =
𝑖𝐿𝐿 + [𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧) + 𝑖𝑅𝑃(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(6) 
 
 
In order to get the effects of securitization on CBs’ leverage and profitability, first 
compare equation (5) with the corresponding leverage ratio that would emerge, given the 
total amount of initial mortgages, in the hypothetical absence of securitization (i.e. when 
𝑧 = 0). We get: 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
It is straightforward to verify through simple algebraic passages that the condition 
for CBs to reduce their leverage and improving their financial solidity under securitization 
reads: 
 
[(1 − 𝜗) − 𝛾1]𝑧 < 0              (7) 
 
Condition (7) holds true since that (𝛾1 > 1). This clearly tells us that, for a given value of 
credit (𝐿 + 𝑀) provided by CBs to the economic system as a whole, the securitization 
process allows commercial banks to decrease their leverage.  
Given this, it is now possible to analyse the extent by which such a securitization-
induced reduction in leverage gives additional space to CBs for the aggressive expansion 
of mortgage issuances. In order to see this, assume that CBs originate different amounts 
of mortgages, 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐶 and  𝑀 , referring respectively to the scenario with and without 
securitization, such that their leverage remains constant. Focusing on the numerator of 
equation (5), the leverage ratio is: 
𝛾1𝐿 + [𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + (1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 𝛾1𝐿 + 𝛾1𝑀 (8) 
 
Hence: 
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𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐶 =
𝛾1
[𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + (1 − 𝜗)𝑧]
𝑀 (9) 
 
From condition (7), we know that 
𝛾1
[𝛾1(1−𝑧)+(1−𝜗)𝑧]
> 1 so that 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐶 > 𝑀. For a given level 
of leverage, the banking sector involved in securitization is able to issue more mortgages 
and expand aggressively its business. 
In order to see how this finding affects CBs’ profitability, we can look at CBs’ ROE 
with and without securitization (for a given level of leverage). With a given 𝐸𝐶𝐵, we can 
focus on ROE numerator. The condition for CBs to increase profitability under 
securitization (and the ensuing provision of repo lending to FFs) reads: 
 
𝑖𝐿𝐿 + 𝑖𝑀𝑀 < 𝑖𝐿𝐿 +
[𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧) + 𝑖𝑅𝑃(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝛾1
[𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + (1 − 𝜗)𝑧]
𝑀 
 
(10) 
After some trivial mathematical passages, condition (10) boils down to:  
 
𝑖𝑀 < 𝑖𝑅𝑃𝛾1 (11) 
 
Three points are worth stressing. First, ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of riskiness 
𝛾1  of the mortgages created by CB, the more likely securitization and ‘originate-and-
distribute’ practices will raise CBs profitability. Accordingly, CBs will be highly 
incentivized to embark in securitization, and securitization practices will quickly spread 
among financial operators. It goes without saying that this scenario may fairly well 
describe the economic environment emerging in the US at the beginning of the 2000s, 
with the boom in sub-prime lending. Second, and perhaps more worrisome, banking 
regulation aimed at restraining the creation of risky assets (say sub-prime mortgages) by 
attaching higher risk coefficients ( 𝛾 ) to risky assets themselves, may turn counter-
productive under securitization. Indeed, it could end out encouraging CBs to undertake 
securitization even more aggressively, rather than disincentive it. If regulatory monetary 
institutions aim at bringing back the financial system to a safe position, they have to 
directly restrain the kind of securitization practices financial operators can adopt. vii  
Finally, securitization is even more likely to increase CBs profitability in a context of 
relatively high monetary market interest rates. In this context, the higher the interest rate 
on repos, the higher the revenues (and hence profitability) accruing to CBs thanks to this 
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specific type of lending. And the securitization process repos aim at fostering and financing 
will get even more frenetic. Interestingly, this was the ‘rentier-friendly’ scenario prevailing 
in most developed economies before the outbreak of the crisis. 
 
3.2 The financial firm sector   
In our model, the FFs sector is the counterpart of CBs in the securitization process. It buys 
assets thanks to resources collected by issuing structured finance products (CDO) and by 
entering repo agreements with CBs. In order to compute FFs sector’s financial leverage, it 
is thus relevant to move attention on its liability side. In this sense, we follow Perotti and 
Suarez (2009) and take explicitly into account the different degrees of maturity of FFs’ 
liabilities to assess the overall sector financial solidity. In particular, let assume that a 
coefficient 𝜆1 > 1 is attached to short-term repo financing, whilst long-term CDOs are 
considered as relatively safer liabilities. Accordingly, equation (13) defines FFs’ leverage in 
terms of their liability structure: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐹𝐹 =
𝐶𝐷𝑂 + 𝜆1𝑅𝑃
𝐸𝐹𝐹
  
(12) 
Consistently with the balance sheet matrix of our simplified economy, by plugging 
equations (3) and (4) into (12), we get: 
  
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐹𝐹 =
𝜗𝑧𝑀 + 𝜆1(1 − 𝜗)𝑧𝑀
𝐸𝐹𝐹
=
[𝜗 + 𝜆1(1 − 𝜗)]𝑧𝑀
𝐸𝐹𝐹
 
(13) 
 
By totally differentiating equation (13) with respect to 𝑀 and 𝜗 and setting it equal to zero, 
one gets:  
 
𝑑𝑀
𝑀
=
(𝜆1 − 1)𝑑𝜗
[(𝜗 + 𝜆1(1 − 𝜗)]
 
(14) 
 
Equation (14) simply tells that FFs can buy an increasing amount of mortgages from 
CBs (
𝑑𝑀
𝑀
> 0) while safely maintaining their leverage ratio unchanged (𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐹𝐹 = 0), just 
by increasing the share of their purchases which are financed through long-term CDOs 
issuances (𝑑𝜗 > 0). FFs were indeed highly interested in getting triple-A evaluations for 
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their structured finance products. Following Coval et al. (2009), this helped FFs to 
artificially stimulate the demand for CDO by final investors, make new CDO issuances 
easier, and eventually expand their balance sheet in an allegedly safe way. In line with 
Figure 1, equation (14) also helps to understand the significant deterioration of FFs 
financial position emerging since the third quarter 2006 on. Indeed, whilst the rising 
concerns about standard CDO riskiness was drying up the corresponding demand by final 
investors, FFs had had to increasingly finance additional (securitized) assets purchases by 
issuing more ‘exotic’ products, i.e. synthetic CDO (also CDO2), as well as short-term repo 
borrowing.     
The implications of the above leverage ratio ‘manipulation’ on FFs’ profitability are 
straightforward, and formalized in equation (15): 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐹𝐹 =
[𝑖𝑀 − 𝜗(𝑟 − 𝑓) − (1 − 𝜗)𝑖𝑅𝑃]𝑧𝑀
𝐸𝐹𝐹
 
(15) 
 
According to the maturity and degree of riskiness of the different assets and liability 
implicitly considered in equation (15), and thus of the ensuing structure of interest rates, 
i.e. 𝑖𝑀 > 𝑖𝑅𝑃 > 𝑟, the profitability of FFs will increase through the expansion of the pool of 
securitized mortgages held in their balance sheet. Other way around, equations (14) and 
(15) together provide a mathematical representation of the well-known statement by 
Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince: “As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and 
dance” (Nakamoto, 2007). Insofar as FFs had the opportunity to easily issue structured 
finance liabilities and increase their profits without affecting their apparently solid 
financial exposition, they had to do so.     
 
4. The impact of shadow banking on the real economy. 
Consistently with the overall portray of the economy as showed in Tables 1 and 2, we take 
into account a simple close economy without government. Consumption by workers’ and 
rentiers, as well as desired investments by NFF are the unique demand injections we take 
into account.  
According to matrices in Table 1 and Table 2, equations (16) and (17) respectively 
define consumption expenditures by workers and rentiers (CW and CR). Workers’ (rentiers’) 
consumption depends positively on disposable income 𝑌𝐷𝑊 (𝑌𝐷𝑅) and wealth 𝑉𝑊  (𝑉𝑅), 
according to the corresponding parameters 𝑐1
𝑊  (𝑐1
𝑅)  and  𝑐2
𝑊  (𝑐2
𝑅). Workers’ disposable 
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income is given by the difference between the total wage bill (𝑤𝑁) and interests paid on 
the outstanding amount of mortgages (iMM). Workers’ wealth consists of deposits 𝐷, and 
houses 𝑝𝐻𝐻.   
 
𝐶𝑊 = 𝑐1
𝑊𝑌𝐷𝑊 + 𝑐2
𝑊 𝑉𝑊 (16) 
 
𝐶𝑅 = 𝑐1
𝑅𝑌𝐷𝑅 + 𝑐2
𝑅 𝑉𝑅 (17) 
 
Rentiers’ income depends exclusively on interests on CDO and dividends 
distributed by CBs and FFs: 
 
𝑌𝐷𝑅 = (𝑟 − 𝑓)𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑅 +𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐶𝐵 + 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝐹 (18) 
With   𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐶𝐵 = 𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝑖𝐿𝐿 + 𝑖𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑃;  𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝐹 = 𝑖𝑀𝑧𝑀 + (𝑓 − 𝑟)𝐶𝐷𝑂 − 𝑖𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑃 
 
Equation (19) below formalises desired productive investments by NFF: 
 
𝑔 =
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑢 − 𝛽2𝑖𝐿 + 𝛽3(𝜋 − 𝑟) + 𝛽4𝑟𝜓  (19) 
With 𝜓 =
𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐹
𝑝𝐾
; 𝛽0,  𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4 > 0 
 
Next to the autonomous component (𝛽0 ) several factors influence productive 
investments. First, desired productive investments depend positively on capacity 
utilization (𝑢) and negatively on the interest rate on loans from CBs (𝑖𝐿). Second, in the 
age of financialization, NFF have increasingly used retained earnings and loans from 
banks in order to acquire financial assets rather than productive means of productions 
(Stockhammer 2004, Krippner, 2005). A potential trade-off stands out between financial 
and productive investments. Equation (19) captures this point by assuming that 
productive investments depend positively on the gap between the profit rate (𝜋) and 
returns on financial investments ( 𝑟 ). The higher is r with respect to 𝜋  (financial 
investments are relatively more lucrative) the higher are NFF’ incentives to divert 
resources towards financial investments themselves, thus scaling down productive 
investments. Finally, recent empirical studies about the impact of financialization on 
investments also show that financial earnings may sometimes provide additional 
resources for undertaking productive investments (Orhangazi, 2008; Tori and Onaran, 
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2015). This is particularly true for relatively small, thus more financially constrained, 
companies. Accordingly, in equation (22), productive investments may also benefit from 
increasing financial earnings as a share of productive capital 𝑟𝜓. 
Equations (20), (21) and (22) describe the production technology and the supply 
side of the economy. We assume a constant coefficient production technique. Accordingly, 
employed labour force N is jointly given by the rate of capacity utilization (𝑢), the installed 
capital stock K, and labour productivity a (equation 20). NFF set the price of their output 
by applying a mark-up (𝜇) on unit labour costs (equation 21). Equation (22) defines the 
profit share.         
 
𝑁 =
𝑢𝐾
𝑎
 
(20) 
    
𝑝 = (1 + 𝜇)
𝑤
𝑎
 (21) 
 
𝜋 =
𝑝𝑌 − 𝑤𝑁
𝑝𝐾
=
𝜇
1 + 𝜇
𝑢 = 𝜏𝑢 
(22) 
 
In order to find the equilibrium level of capacity utilization (𝑢∗), the corresponding 
growth rate of the productive capital stock (𝑔∗), one simply needs to find the demand-
driven equilibrium level of output on the goods market. After normalizing consumption 
expenditures by the value of the capital stock and after assuming that the interest rates on 
loans and mortgages are equal (i.e. 𝑖𝑀 = 𝑖𝐿 = 𝑖), we get: 
 
𝑢∗ =
[𝑐1
𝑅 − 𝑐1
𝑊]𝑖𝑚 + 𝑐1
𝑅𝜑 +  𝑐2
𝑤𝛺𝑤 + 𝑐2
𝑅𝛺𝑅 + 𝛽0 − 𝛽2𝑖 + (𝜓𝛽4 − 𝛽3)𝑟
[1 − 𝑐1
𝑊(1 − 𝜏) − 𝛽3𝜏 − 𝛽1]
 
 
(23) 
With 𝛺𝑅 =
𝑉𝑅
𝑝𝐾
;   𝛺𝑊 =
𝑉𝑊
𝑝𝐾
; 𝑚 =
𝑀
𝑝𝐾
; 𝑙 =
𝐿
𝑝𝐾
;  𝜑 =
𝑌𝐷𝑅−𝑖𝑀
𝑝𝐾
= 𝑖𝑙 + 𝑖𝑅𝑃
𝑅𝑃
𝑝𝐾
+ (𝑓 − 𝑟)
𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐹
𝑝𝐾
 
  
𝑔∗ = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝜏)𝑢
∗ − 𝛽2𝑖 + (𝛽4𝜓 − 𝛽3)𝑟  (24) 
 
Even further, we also analyse the distributive consequences of shadow banking 
practices by computing the ratio  (𝜎∗)  between labour income and rentiers’ income as 
emerging out of the short-run equilibrium (see equation 25 below). Admittedly, this is an 
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overly simple measure of income distribution. Yet, it may well reflect the outstanding 
evidence about rentiers’ increasing capacity to ‘appropriate’ larger parts of domestic 
income also through complex financial relations. Indeed, there is no doubt that new 
financial dynamics, and the connected rise in rentier-type income (versus labour income) 
lie behind the rising inequality registered in developed countries in the last decades 
(Epstein and Power, 2003; Piketty, 2014).     
 
𝜎∗ =
𝑌𝐷𝑅
𝑤𝑁 − 𝑖𝑚
=
𝜒
(1 − 𝜏)𝑢∗ − 𝑖𝑚
 
(25) 
 
With 𝜒 = 𝑌𝐷𝑅 𝑝𝐾⁄ = 𝜑 + 𝑖𝑚 
 
4.1 Comparative statics 1: the case of a house mortgage boom 
Once defined the short-run equilibria of our model, we can analyse how changes in 
financialization-related variables may affect the real economy, as well as modify the 
equilibrium itself. Let assume, for instance, that the development of shadow-banking 
practices led financial institutions to aggressively increase the quantity of mortgages (M) 
conceded to workers through time. In turn, this has raised workers’ wealth (by raising 
dwellings’ price), as well as their corresponding indebtedness. On the one hand, the (ex-
post) increase in workers’ wealth (ΩW) may possibly feed more consumption through a 
kind of ‘Bhaduri-type’ capital gain channel (Bhaduri, 2011).viii On the other hand, higher 
debt service payments on the shoulders of working households indirectly redistribute 
income from workers to rentiers (through more generous dividends distributed by CB). 
While consumption expenditures of the latter might increase, the former might have to 
reduce consumption due to a lower disposable income. The overall effect of such a long 
process of financialization on economic activity is unclear, as counter-balancing forces are 
at work. Indeed, by differentiating equation (26) with respect to 𝑚, we get: 
 
𝑑𝑢∗ =
[(𝑐1
𝑅 − 𝑐1
𝑊)𝑖 + 𝑐2
𝑤(𝜕𝛺𝑤 𝜕𝑚⁄ )]
[1 − 𝑐1
𝑊(1 − 𝜏) − 𝛽3𝜏 − 𝛽1]
𝑑𝑚 
 
((26) 
It is straightforward to see that the numerator of equation (26) can be either 
positive or negative. The term (𝑐1
𝑅 − 𝑐1
𝑊)𝑖 is surely negative and constitutes a financial-led 
extraction on economic activity since that 𝑐1
𝑅 < 𝑐1
𝑊. This condition represents the negative 
effects on aggregate consumption of redistributing income away from workers towards 
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rentier. Redistribution takes indirectly place through the mediation of FFs’ by the creation 
of new (rentiers’) financial assets and, correspondingly, new (workers’) liabilities. 
However, the ‘consumption expanding’ wealth effect 𝑐2
𝑤(𝜕𝛺𝑤 𝜕𝑚⁄ ) is positive. Economic 
activity will thus contract (expand) in the event the first distributive factor would outstrip 
(fall below) the wealth factor. In the first case, paraphrasing Bhaduri and Marglin (1990, 
p. 38), we deal with a ‘shadow-banking-led stagnationist regime’. In the second case, an 
‘exhilarationist’ scenario prevails.    
According to equation (24), the expansionary or contractionary effect of a house 
mortgage boom on economic activity is transmitted to productive capital accumulation 
through the standard accelerator component. More in details, we have: 
 
𝑑𝑔∗ = (𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝜏)(𝜕𝑢
∗ 𝜕𝑚⁄ )𝑑𝑚  (27) 
 
As far as income distribution is concerned, a reduction or an increase in the ratio 
between rentiers’ and workers’ income will highly depend on within which of the two 
regimes (expansionary or contractionary) the shadow-banking-led house mortgage boom 
takes place. Totally differentiating equation (25) with respect to ‘m’, one gets: 
 
𝑑𝜎∗ =
𝑖[(1 − 𝜏)𝑢∗ − 𝑖𝑚] − 𝜒[(1 − 𝜏) 𝜕𝑢∗ 𝜕𝑚⁄ − 𝑖]
[(1 − 𝜏)𝑢∗ − 𝑖𝑚]2
𝑑𝑚 
 
 
After some re-arrangements, we can verify that a house mortgage boom could 
hypothetically squeeze income inequality, i.e. (𝑑𝜎∗ 𝑑𝑚⁄ < 0) should condition (28) be 
fulfilled: 
 
𝜀𝑢,𝑚 > 𝜂
∗
(1 + 𝜎∗)
𝜎∗
 
 
(28) 
 
Where 𝜀𝑢,𝑚 is the elasticity of economic activity to an increase in the number of mortgages 
created by CB, while 𝜂∗ is workers’ debt service-to-income ratio. Referring to the above set 
of equations, it is straightforward to see that, should economic activity react negatively to 
an expanding mortgage market  (𝜀𝑢,𝑚 < 0) , condition (28) will never be satisfied. 
Financialization-led economic slowdown or recessions will go hand in hand with 
worsening income distributions. Having said this, even in the contest of a financialization-
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led economic expansion, it is far from sure that a more equalitarian income distribution 
would emerge. Economic activity might react positively to expanding mortgage lending, 
but still not enough to meet condition (28). Interestingly, the higher the workers’ debt 
service burden, the greater the right-hand-side of condition (28), and the more likely this 
condition will be above 1. In this context, in order to improve income distribution during 
financialization-driven economic expansions, economic activity should over-react by far 
to mortgage increases. It goes without saying that it is hard to imagine that such a scenario 
will ever take place. Indeed, our analysis seems to suggest that financialization-led 
expansions will be characterized by persistently worsening income distributions.          
 
4.2 Comparative statics 2: Living in a world where rentiers are well alive 
There is a mounting debate among economists and policy-makers about the effects of the 
current unusually low level of interest rates on economic activity. Critics (see Bindseil et 
al. 2015) stress that low interest rates, as induced by unconventional monetary policies, 
jeopardize savers. Accordingly, they call for a quick return to normality so that savings 
could be remunerated properly, and investment stimulated from the supply side of the 
credit market. In order to assess if this orthodox claim finds any ground, it is interesting 
to see what happens in our model if we assume a generalized increase in the interest rates 
on financial activities, and thus higher remunerations for rentiers and NFF on their 
respective financial asset holdings. This exercise could somehow represent the economic 
scenario prevailing in the last years preceding the outbreak of the 2007-2008 crisis, when 
rentiers were ‘well alive and in a good shape’. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that interest rates on financial assets increase 
all by the same amount, so that di= diRP= dr. In addition, we set 𝜌 =  
𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐹
𝐶𝐷𝑂
, which 
identifies the share of CDO held by NFF with respect to the total amount of CDO issued. 
The total amount of financial assets as a share of the capital stock held (directly or 
indirectly through the financial markets) by rentiers is 𝜉 = [(𝑙 + 𝑚) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑧𝑚 − (1 −
𝜌)𝜃𝑧𝑚]. 
Equations (29) and (30) define the effect of such ‘rentier-friendly’ economic 
scenario on economic activity and productive capital investments respectively: 
 
𝑑𝑢∗ =
𝑐1
𝑅𝜉⏞
+
−𝑐1
𝑊𝑚⏞    
−
−[𝛽2 + (𝛽3 − 𝛽4𝜓)]⏞            
?
[1 − 𝑐1
𝑊(1 − 𝜏) − 𝛽3𝜏 − 𝛽1]
𝑑𝑟 = 𝜐𝑑𝑟 
 
(29) 
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𝑑𝑔∗ = [(𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝜏)𝜐+ [(𝛽4𝜓 − 𝛽3) − 𝛽2]⏞                      
?
] 𝑑𝑟 
 
 
(30) 
As before, there are no clear-cut conclusions and different regimes could prevail. 
Hypothetically, a ‘rentier-led’ regime akin to the ‘puzzling’ regime described by Hein 
(2010) could emerge, with both capacity utilization and productive capital accumulation 
responding positively to increased rentiers’ income. However, the economic mechanisms 
leading to this outcome are different. Indeed, Hein (2010) puts at the centre of his analysis 
the financialization of NFF, and the redistribution of NFF profits to rentiers in the form of 
higher dividends as the prime mechanism possibly leading to rentier-led economic 
expansions. In this paper, redistribution takes place between workers and rentiers via the 
mediation of an ‘active’ financial sector, which constantly creates new (financial) 
investment opportunities for rentiers, along with new liabilities for workers. 
More in details, equation (29) implies that the equilibrium level of capacity 
utilization would expand due to higher interest rates only if increasing rentiers’ 
consumptions would more than compensate for the reduction in workers’ one, as well as 
for the likely contraction in NFF’ productive investments. In this sense, equation (30) also 
tells that productive capital accumulation might hypothetically react both ways in a world 
of relatively high interest rates. Yet, the more NFF consider financial assets as substitute 
for real investment, the more likely the sponsoring a ‘rentier-friendly’ environment will 
lead productive investments to stagnate. ix 
Last but not least, condition (31) defines under which circumstances income 
distribution might improve, when financial assets (structured and non-structured) 
guarantee remunerative returns: 
       
𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝑟
< 0  if 𝜀𝑢,𝜒 > 𝑓 (𝑚⏞
+
, 1 − 𝜏⏞  
−
) 
(31) 
 
With 𝜀𝑢,𝜒 as the elasticity of economic activity to increases in rentiers’ income. In line with 
the findings of the previous point, a ‘rentier-friendly’ world will be hardly associated with 
an improving income distribution. Indeed, should increases in the relative 
remunerativeness of financial assets versus productive assets entail a contracting 
economic activity, i.e. (𝜀𝑢,𝜒 < 0), condition (31) will never hold true. During recessions, 
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rentiers will forge further ahead with respect to wage earners. During expansions, income 
inequality might theoretically shrink. Nonetheless, (𝜀𝑢,𝜒 > 0) is not sufficient for condition 
(31) to fulfil. Actually, a ‘rentier-led expansion-with-decreasing inequality’ might only take 
place if the positive response by economic activity will be strong enough to overcome the 
right-hand side of condition (31). Interestingly, the right-hand side of equation (31) is a 
positive function of ‘m’, whilst it responds negatively to the wage share (1 − 𝜏) . 
Accordingly, the higher is the degree of financialization of the economy (as grasped by the 
ratio between house mortgages and the productive capital stock) the harder the possibility 
that any rise in interest rates on financial assets could lead to a more equitable income 
distribution. Even further, the economic context characterizing most developed economies 
since the mid-1970s, i.e. the persistent reduction in the wage shares (as favoured by NFF 
financialization), makes even more unrealistic the fulfilment of condition (31). These 
findings seem to recall how a Keynesian-type ‘euthanasia of the rentiers’ might be highly 
desirable in order to feed a sustained, and more equitable, economic recovery.   
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the post-Keynesian analysis of financialization by presenting an 
‘augmented’ post-Keynesian model in which an ‘active’ shadow banking sector producing 
structured finance instruments is explicitly formalized. 
We show from a macroeconomic point of view how, before the crisis, securitization 
and shadow banking allowed financial institutions to increase the issuance of mortgages, 
as well as the profitability of the whole financial sector, while apparently keeping their 
financial position stable. In this sense, the 1996 reinterpretation of the Glass-Steagall act 
(eventually repealed in 1999) appears as a turning point (see the corresponding sudden 
and steep rise of MBS in Figure 1). Even further, interpreting the post-crisis fall in MBS 
issuances as a signal of the end of shadow banking can be extremely erroneous, probably 
a pure wishful thinking. Figure 2 shows the stock of four different securitised loans in the 
US: revolving credit, motor vehicle loans, consumer credit, and student loans. It is easy to 
see how all the series present astonishing upward trends in the post-crisis period. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
Even worse, our model clearly shows that the securitization process makes 
legislations on capital requirement not only ineffective, but also potentially 
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counterproductive. If banks have to accomplish with strict capital ratio requirements, 
while having access to securitization, they will have a strong incentive to take part in the 
creation of structured finance products to lighten their balance sheets, hence harming the 
stability of the economy as a whole. It seems therefore necessary (and urgent) to apply 
some form of control and limitation to the link between the issuer of the credit and 
securitizing system. Securitization makes credit easier. Paraphrasing Keynes, ‘when the 
goal of credit issuance is not the financing of productive activities, but the creation of 
financial commodities, the job is likely to be highly noxious for the economy’. Traditional 
banks should be dragged out of the shades. 
The final part of the paper analyses the effects of shadow banking practices on real 
economy variables, i.e. economic activity, the accumulation of means of production, and 
income distribution. In modern financialized economies, any analysis of demand and 
growth regimes likely turns out as useless if it fails to take into account how shadow-
banking related activity can redistribute income from wage earners to rentiers. This paper 
shows that a highly financialized economy and/or a ‘rentier-friendly’ regime very likely 
could give rise to economic stagnation with rising inequality. 
This paper only takes into account short-term mechanisms. It could be considered 
as a first step of a promising venue of research in which shadow banking practices are 
explicitly integrated into macro models. The natural following step would be to broaden 
even further the existing contributions by Eatwell et al. (2008) and Nikolaidi (2015), in 
order to explore more in details how the internal circular dynamics of contemporaneous 
financial systems (i.e. the securitization of financial assets and the creation of complex 
structured financial products as propelled by the extension of repos lending) could affect 
the medium-to-long run evolution of the real economy in terms of economic growth, 
income distribution, and the stability of the economy as whole.  
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Figures and Tables  
Figure 1: Private depository institutions' total mortgages asset; Private depository institutions' 
repurchase agreements asset; Total real estate loans owned and securitized by Finance 
Companies. 1970Q2 =100, for all the series. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (US), Flow of Funds Z1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Securitized assets, 2006Q1 =100. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (US), Flow of Funds Z1. 
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Table 1. Balance sheet matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Workers Rentiers NF-Firms 
Commercial 
Banks 
Financial 
Firms 
Central 
Bank 
Σ 
Capital   +K    +K 
Deposits +D   -D   0 
Houses +pHH      +pHH 
Cash    +JCB +JFF -J 0 
Mortgages -M   +(1-z)M +zM  0 
Loans   -L +L   0 
CDO  +CDOR +CDONFF  -CDO  0 
Repos    +RP -RP  0 
Equities  +E  -ECB -EFF  0 
Net worth NVW NVR NVNFF NVCB NVFF NV +K +pHH 
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Table 2. Full integration matrix 
 
 Workers Rentiers 
Non-financial  
firms 
Commercial 
Banks 
Financial  
Firms 
Central 
Bank 
Σ 
 current capital current capital current capital current capital current capital   
Wages +W    -W       0 
Consumption -C    +C       0 
Real Investment     +I -I      0 
Financial 
payments: 
            
Dividends   +DIV    -DIVCB  -DIVFF   0 
Mortgages -iM*M      +iM*(1-z)*M  + iM*z*M   0 
CDOs   +r*CDOR  +r*CDONFF    -r*CDO   0 
CDOs   -f*CDOR  -f*CDONFF    +f*CDO   0 
Loans     -iL*L  + iL*L     0 
Repos       + iRP*RP  - iRP*RP   0 
Σ -SW +SW -SR +SR -PNFF +PNFF 0 0 0 0 - 0 
Change in:             
Deposits  -∆D      +∆D    0 
Houses  -∆p*H          -∆p*H 
Mortgages  +∆M      -(1-z)*∆M  -z*∆M  0 
Loans      +∆L  -∆L    0 
CDOs    -∆CDOR  -∆CDONFF    +∆CDO  0 
Repos        -∆RP  +∆RP  0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - -∆P*H 
∆Net Worth 
∆NWW = SavW + ∆pM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- -∆p*H 
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Table 3. Commercial banks leverage under and without securitization 
 Under securitization Without securitization 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 
𝛾1𝐿 + [𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + (1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝐸𝐶𝐵
       
𝛾1(𝐿 + 𝑀)
𝐸𝐶𝐵
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Endnotes 
i   These models usually formalize the distributive consequences of the NFF’ increased shareholder value 
orientation by assuming a higher mark-up rate on variable costs. 
ii Bhaduri et al. (2015) present a short-run macro-aggregated model in which they focus on the consequences of 
shadow banking-related practices on economic activity only. They do not provide any analysis as to shadow 
banking implications on income distribution.     
iii The decision of including two specular flows (f*CDO and r*CDO) originating from the same asset is motivated by 
the attempt of making explicit the considerable amount of profits FFs can make out of fees charged on the financial 
assets they sell to the savers.  
iv Indeed, financial corporations originally engineered CDO contracts as apparently riskless financial products, 
guarantying stable prices and relatively high (coupon) interest rates to final investors. This is why, before the 
crisis, most of them got ‘triple A’ evaluations from rating agencies, and they were vastly used as collaterals in repo 
agreements. Accordingly, investments on CDOs were not primarily driven by speculations on possible capital 
gains and changes in their prices. We think the evolution of their prices (prior to their collapse when the crisis 
erupted, of course), and of the corresponding effective interest rate, to be minor elements driving final savers’ 
investments on CDOs.     
v Our representation of repo lending activity is a simplification of a much more complex reality. Indeed, repo 
lending, i.e. an increasingly important source of finance for FFs involved in shadow banking, traditionally shows 
relevant intra-sectorial component. The social accounting perspective of the balance sheets shows inter-sectorial 
net positions, while hiding intra-sector transactions. Despite of this implicit simplification, our model still 
succeeds in capturing the core of the dynamics we analyse and the fact that the traditional banking sector plays a 
key role as a net source financing for the financial sector. According to Copeland et al. (2012), “clearing banks are 
not only agents, but also the largest creditors in the tri-party repo market on each business day (Copeland et al., 
2012 p.6)”. 
vi Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMF) as well are important creditors for financial institutions involved in 
securitization. However, for the purpose of this paper, their intermediation activity can be captured in the relation 
between rentiers and FFs. 
vii Following Lavoie (2012), a possible solution could consist in allowing traditional securitization practices only, 
according to which assets are not moved out of CBs’ balance sheets, but remain in the balance sheet of the 
originators. 
viii  We ground our first comparative statics exercise on the effect that, in a highly financialized economy, the past 
heightened stream of mortgage creations may have induced on current consumption by raising households’ 
wealth and, at the same time, households’ indebtedness. Differently from Bhaduri et al. (2015), in equation (23) 
we do not explicitly take into account a positive link between current consumption expenditures and current 
capital gains. We do this in order to maintain our model as simple as possible. The inclusion of this further 
element, although absolutely feasible within our framework, would have complicated the analysis, without adding 
much to its economic implications.  
ix A generalized increase in interest rates will usually curtail productive investments by NFF through two main 
channels. First, external financing from CBs will get more expansive. Secondly, and perhaps more relevantly in a 
time of financialization, the accumulation of financial assets rather than productive ones will become relatively 
more remunerative. The only possible way through which NFF financialization could go hand in hand with 
booming productive investments is by providing NFF with higher cash flows, and hence more ‘internal’ resources 
to finance additional productive investments, as accruing by holding highly remunerative structured finance 
products.    
 
                                                        
